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INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this paper is to estimate, empirica lly, the degree of
industria l concentra tion in Mexico between 1965 and 1970 and to verify some
hypothese s concernin g its causes.

In particula r, we study the effects that

market size and the most efficient size of firm have on the degree of indus

trial concentra tion.

In Section I we present the model used to test our

main hypothese s and in Section II we discuss the results obtained.

However,

in order to center our discussio n in a broader perspecti ve and before we
begin the analysis of the main topics of this paper, we review in this
Inttoduct ion the literatur e that relates concentra tion to some relevant
issues of welfare economics , emloymen t, and income distribut ion.

We

should emphasize , however, that we do not make any empirical analysis
of these important issues.

A.

Welfare and Concentra tion
Firms exhibit different behavior with regard to pricing and output

produced under different market structure s (perfect competiti on, monopoly,
oligopoly etc.); hence, the pattern of resource allocatio n and level of
efficienc y also varies according to the type of market structure . For
example, in a monopoli stic market structure (i.e. one with a high degree
of concentra tion), as compared with one of perfect competiti on, price is
set above marginal cost, output is lower, and "abnormal " profits result.
A deviation from the marginal condition s that prevail in perfect compe
tition causes disequilib rium in the marginal condition of efficienc y (in the
sense of Pareto) with the consequen t loss of social welfare.

The degree of

social welfare due to monopoly has been studied using the notion of consumer
surplus since the time of Dupuit and Marshall, and more recently by
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Harberger (1954), who has quantified its effects.

1

When there are economies of scale, the marginal conditions for
efficiency in production and consumption necessary to attain a situation
of Pareto optimality are not fulfilled.

In this situation the economic

policy dilemma is to know to what extent the disadvantages of a high level
of concentration (monopoly markets with high prices, low output, consumer
welfare loss and inefficient resource allocation) are offset by the advan
tages (low unitary costs, and probably a rapid rate of technological change)
of the economies of scale of a concentrated market (Williamson 1968).
From this perspective the central policy problem is not to determine if
there are economies of scale, since they usually exist, but to know
whether they can be obtained only with the scale of plant that accompanies
very high degree of concentration.

If the trade-off between the disadvan

tages of concentration and the advantages of the economies of scale favor
the latter, it follows that large firms should be encouraged.

On

the

contrary, if the advantages of the economies of scale associated with a high
level of concentration are small, welfare can be increased by stimulating
a more competitive economy of small firms.

If it were possible to determine

the advantages and disadvantages of concentration we could conceivably
establish the most convenient level of concentration for the economy.

,0

1 0ne of the
few studies on the welfare cost of monopoly in a less
developed country is the one by Alonzo (1969) for the Philippines.
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B.

Employment and Concent ration
It ·is general ly accepted that in most of the less develope d

countrie s capital is scarce and labor is abundan t.

Given this factor

endowment, a high degree of efficien cy is attained in the economy when the
product ivity of capital is high.

The relevan t question , from the point of

view of concent ration policie s, is to determin e whether small firms use
less capital and other scarce resource s than the large ones to produce a
given level of output.

Most of the availab le evidence suggests that small

firms tend to use less capital per unit of output than large ones (Ranis 1962,
Marsden 1969, Mehta

1969, Todd 1971, Berry 1972), although some contrary

evidence also shows that the product ivity of labor and of capital increase s
with the size of firm (Dhar and Lydall 1961, Boon 1964, Sanderas a 1966, 1969,
Cardwel l 1978).

Moreove r, since, in general, labor product ivity (output-

labor ratio) tends to be higher for large firms than for the small and
medium size ones, and since an industry with few large firms

is usually

one with a high degree of concent ration, it follows that labor product ivity
increase s with concent ration.

If we accept the argumen t that small firms

are more efficien t in the intensiv e use of the scarce capital (low capital 
output ratios), and also make extensiv e use of the abundan t labor (low
capital- labor ratio), then it is meaning ful to reduce the level of concent ra
tion, i.e. to increase the number of small and medium size firms in the economy.
The point of view that small and medium size firms use more labor
intensiv e techniqu es (low capital- labor ratio) than the large ones, is
supporte d by most of the empiric al evidence (Dhar and Lydall 1961, Ranis
1961, Shetty 1963, Marsden 1966, Berry 1972, Ditullio 1972).

The reasons
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usually given to explain the use of labor-in tensive techniqu es by small
and medium size firms are as follows.

Small and medium size firms face

a more competi tive environm ent than do large size firms and are thus forced
to choose a technolo gy more in accordan ce with the factor abundanc e in
the economy.

They are also stimulat ed to innovate in the directio n of

labor-in tensive techniqu es.

In other words, small firms are confront ed

with a set of relative factor prices closer to the real scarcity prices
than the set faced by the large ones.

Large firms, on the other hand, tend

to be less labor intensiv e and to pay high wages due to the presence of
powerfu l unions and because wage legislat ion is more effectiv e in large
firms than in 8mall ones.

It has been found by Garberin o (1950), Wei.s (1966)

and Phlips (1971), that large firms in highly concent rated industri es pay
higher salaries than firms in less concent rated ones.

The negative effect

of high wages on employm ent has been documented by Reynolds and Gregory
(1965).

Another factor for the capital intensiv eness of large firms is that

subsidis ed credit and other capital subsidie s such as prefere ntial fiscal
treatme nt, as well as faciliti es to import capital are mostly availabl e to them. 1
In accordan ce with the foregoin g argumen t, wages tend to be low (high)
and capital costs high (low) for small (large) size firms, and hence they
tend to use labor (capital ) intensiv e techniqu es.

If it is true that small

firms use labor-in tensive techniqu es,not because they operate on a small

1This

is particu larly importa nt if it is true that the advantag es
of large scale producti on and growth of firms can be explaine d by the
economi es of scale that origina te in the size of the capital stock
(see Fei, J.C.H. 1977).
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scale, but because they face a less distorted set of relative factor
prices than the large ones, it can be argued that policies to d.ncrease
employment should not encourage the creation of more small size firms
(reduce concentratio n) but should work to eliminate the factor price
distortions that give rise to dual factor markets.

If these policies are

successful, firms of all sizes will adopt more labor-inten sive technologie s.

C.

Income Distributio n and Concentra.ti on.
Firms of different sizes select different capital-lab or ratios

(technology ) when the relative prices of capital and labor change; i.e.
the elasticity of substitution varies with size of firm.

Therefore, the

elasticity of substitution in a highly concentrate d industry with large
firms will have a different value than a more competitive one with small
firms.

If the economy behaves according to neoclassica l principles, we can

establish a clear relationship between the value of the elasticity of
substitutio n and the ratio of relative shares in output of capital and
labor.
If, as the evidence suggests, both the elasticity of substitutio n in
the manufacturi ng sector of less developed countries varies between
industries (Daniels 1969, Katz 1969, Williamson 1971) and the degree of
concentrati on also varies among these industries (Gollas 1975, Syrkin 1970,
Balderas 1973), then a general increase, or decrease, in the price of one
factor of production will change its relative share in total industrial
output.

Suppose that in the manufacturi ng sector there is an industry

composed of large firms, with a high degree of concentratio n and an
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elasticity of substitutio n of less than one; and another industry of
small firms, low degrees of concentratio n and an elasticity of substitutio n
greater than one.

Under these circumstanc es, as the wage rate increases

we expect the share of the less concentrated industry (elasticity of
substitutio n more than one) to decline and the one of the more concentrate d
(elasticity of substitutio n less than one) to increase.

The final outcome

would be to shift the distribution of industrial income from the less
concentrate d to the more concentrated industry.
One of the few formulations that relate concentratio n and income
distributio n is that of Kalecki (1951) which proposes a model of income
distribution and shows that the labor share varies negatively with the
"average" degree of monopoly in the economy. 1 The implication s of the
model are that the greater the degree of monopoly conditions in the economy
the greater will be the share of monopoly profits and the smaller the share
of labor in national output.
The relation between concentratio n and profits has been widely
studied in the industrial nations (see Weiss 1974 for a recent review
of the literature) .

Most of the empirical evidence shows that there

exists a positive and significant effect of concentrati on on the rate of
profits.

Little is known in the developing countries about the mechanism

by which the degree of concentratio n is related to the factors that
1

In Kalecki's formulation :
W•

(1 - (1/~ ]

where Wis the share of labor, and n the average degree of monopoly.

-7-

determine the rate of profit among different industries and how concen
tration affects income distribution.
When studying income distribution it is important to know the
origin and the effects of price increases, since inflation redistributes
income differ~ntly among people, regions and industries.

Again, the

evidence for the more industrialized nations supports the hypothesis
that the largest increases in prices take place in the more concentrated
industries (Blair 1974, Ross 1973, Phlips 1971).

Little is known in

less developed countries of the role that the more concentrated indus
tries or the degree of concentration in the economy as a whole, have in
determining the rate of inflation and its distributional effects.

I

THE EFFECTS OF MARKET SIZE .AND OF THE OPTIMUM FIRM SIZE ON INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION.

A.

The Industrial Concentration in Mexico
The degree of industrial concentration may be described by the

distribution of the firm size as measured by, for example, the value of
output or the number of workers.

Using the census data for 1965 and 1970,

Figures 1 and 2 show the distribution of firms by size according to the
number of workers.

According to Figure 2, in 1970 the majority of firms

in the industrial sector were small and only a few were large:

almost

63% of the industrial firms had less than 6 workers and only about 1.7%
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had more than 250 employees.

Table 1 shows the distribution of output

and employment by size of firm for 1970.

The distribution of employment

and output by firm size is highly concentrated:

the small firms (less

than 6 workers) which make up 63% of all firms produce only 2.4% of
industrial production and give employment to only 7.2% of the labor force
in the industrial sector.

On the other hand, a small number of large

firms (250 workers or more), only 1.7% of the total number of firms,
produced almost 54$ of industrial output and gave employment to about

42% of the labor force in that sector.
Economists have devised several summary measures of industrial
concentration.

Industrial concentration, like income concentration among

individuals, or land concentration among farmers, may be viewed as a measure
of the inequality of a distribution by size.

In the case of industrial

concentration it is of interest to know the extent to which a small number
of large firms controls
in an industry.

a large proportion of the output or the employment

From this perspective it is important to know the degree

of dispersion of the distribution of firms by size and not their absolute
number.

One can observe the same degree of dispersion (concentration)

between two industries with wide differences in the number of firms each
has.

Some authors believe, however, that the study of industrial concen

tration should be focused not only on the analysis of the tmequal distri
bution of firms by size but also on the absolute number of firms
%-(Adelman 1951).

Because of these different views, one finds in the lit

erature both measures of concentration and measures of inequality, also
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Figure 1
Mexico :
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Mexico:

Figure 2
Size Distri bution of Firms Accord ing to Employment
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Table 1
Mexico: Number, Employment and Value of Output of Industrial Firms by Size Class

1970

Size of Firm
(Number of
workers)

0
6
16
26
51
76
101
176
251
351
501
751

-

5
15
25
50
75
100
175
250
350
500
750

Total

Source:

Proportion of Total
Number of Firms

Proportion of Total
. Employment

0.46
0.32
0.34

100

2.4
3.4
3.3
6.5
5.7
5.1
10.9
9.0

7.2
6.6
4.4
8.5
6.5
5.4
10.9
8.2

62.86
17.56
5.33
5.66
2.54
1.46
1.95
0.93

r-59

%

%

%

1.71

Proportion of Total
Output

42.3

r-3

8.0
8.1
18.9
100

53.7

l

8.1
9.8
10.7
25.1

100

Manuel Gollas, "Reflexiones sobre la concentracion econ6mica y el
crecimiento de las empresas", El Trimestre Econ6mico, No. 166,
Vol. :xi11 (2), Mexico, April-June, 1976, pp. 457-485.
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referred to as measures of absolute and relative concentration, respectively.
It has been shown, however, that in some cases measures of inequality can
be transformed to measures of concentration and vice versa (Marfles 1971).
An

extended discussion of different measures of industrial concentration

can be fot.md in Hall and Tideman (1967), and in Hart (1971, 1975).
To measure the degree of industrial concentration in Mexico we used,
among other indexes to be discussed later in the paper, the Gini coefficient
and the Herfindahal index. 1 We estimate these indices at two and four-digit
levels according to the industrial classification of the Mexican Industrial
Census for 1965 and 1970.

The Gini and the •Herfindahal measures of employ

ment concentration at the two-digit level are shown in Table 2.

It can

be seen from this table that the degree of concentration varies considerably
among industries and that the concentration ranking (columns 4 and 8),
according to the Gini coefficient, did not change in most industries between
1965 and 1970.

B.

The Effects of the Extent of the Market and the Size of Firms on the
Degree of Industrial Concentration
It is often argued that the degree of concentration in an industry

and the size of its market are inversely related (Nelson 1963, Weiss 1963,
Rosenblueth 1957, Pashigian 1969, Sawyer 1971).

1see

The argument runs as

page 23 for a definition of the Herfindahal index. As with
the Gini coefficient, the Herfindahal index approaches one when there is
total inequality.

Table 2
Mexico:

Indices of Industrial Concentration According to Emplo}'1'ent
1965 - 1970

1965
Industry

Herfindahl
(1)

Gini

1970

Number of
Firms

(2)

(3)

Concentration
Rank
(4)

Herfindahl

Gini

(5)

(6)

Number of
Firms

Concentratim
Rank

I
t-'

11
12
14
15
20
21
22
23
24

Coal and graphite
Metallic mines
Gravel and Sand mines
Non-metallic minerals
Food Products
Beverages
Tobacco
Textiles
Clothing and Shoes
25 Wood Products
26 Furniture
27 Paper
28 Printing
29 Leather
30 Rubber
31 Chemicals
32 Petro-Chemicals
33-Non-Hetallic Products
34 Steel and Iron
35 Metal Products
36 Machinery and Tools
37 Electrical Products
38 Automobile and Transport
39 Various Manufacturing

Source:

0.730
0.306
0.171
0.165
0.145
0.192
o. 722
0.170
0.126
0.198
0.125
0.185
0.120
0.140
0.140
0.157
0.332
0.148
0.455
0.140
0.128
0.225
0.333
0.139

0.557
0.757
0.601
0.661
0.709
0.811
o. 772
0.685
0.694
0.782
0.669
o. 710
0.699
0.647
0.770
0.709
0.682
0.758
0.665
o. 774
o. 734
o. 728
o. 776
0.661

22
1
2
6
1
2
1
2
3
4
2
1

18
333
218
219
187
487
30
721
234
749
265
444
730
769
036
175
49
912
187
337
043
777
435
801

24
8
23
20
13
1
3
16
15
2
18
11

14
22
6
12
17
7
19
5
9
10
4
21

0.345
0.322
0.167
0.159
0.144
0.233
0.419
0.171
0.125
0.210
0.129
0.196
0.124
0.153
0.156
0.171
0.180
0.163
o.410
0.145
0.134
0.220
0.361
0.133

0.615
0.734
0.598
0.672
0.720
0.822
0.662
0.692
o. 718
0.758
0.654
0.705
0.705
0.641
0.768
o. 712
0.708
0.763
0.726
o. 773
o. 736
0.104
0.802
o. 714

23
1
2
6
3
3
1
2
4

5
1
1

14
323
265
215
764
263
52
579
743
490
107
517
323
792
403
511
80
704
322
021
754
949
695
410

22
8

23
18

10
1
19
17
11
6

20
15
15
21
4
13

14
5
9
3

7
16
2

12

Manuel Gollas, "Reflexiones sobre la concentraci6n econ6mica y el crecimiento de las empresas", El Trimestre Econ6mico,
No, 166, Vol. XLII (2), Mexico, April-June, 1976, pp.457-485.
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follows:

Since empirically one typically finds a positive relationship

between the market size and the number of firms, and a negative relation
ship between the number of firms and the degree of concentration, then
it follows that the larger the size of the market the smaller the
degree of concentration and vice versa.
As a first step, we empirically test whether the degree of concen
tration and the number of firms in the industrial sector of Mexico are
inversely related.

Another index of concentration, besides the Gini and Herfindaha~

is the number of the largest firms that together produce 80% of the output
of an industry. 1 we refer to this index as c and it measures inversely
2
the degree of concentration, i.e. the larger its value the smaller the
degree of concentration and vice versa.

Regressions 1 and 2 in Table 3

relate (in linear and in linear logarithmic form) the number of firms in

an industry N, and the index of concentration in that industry, C. Regression
2

3 relates the rate of change of these variables between 1965 and 1970.
used for these calculations is at the four-digit level.
expected and not surprisingly,

The data

Our estimates, as

support the assertion that the number of

firms and the degree of concentration are inversely related.

Because of

the linear-log specification of the regressions, the estimated coefficients are elasticities.

~

1

Thus, according to equation (2), for example, an

Another index commonly found in studies of industrial concentration
is the proportion of output produced by the largest 4 or 8 firms in an
industry. The equivalent index that we use is the number of firms needed
to produce a certain percentage of the output of an industry, in our case
80%.
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increase of 10% in the number of firms in the industrial sector of Mexico
would have the effect of reducing by 7. 8% the degree of industrial concen
tration.

According to equation (3), an increase of 10% in the rate of

change of the number of firms will decrease concentration by more than 6%.
We now turn to the main focus of this paper: ·What are the factors

which determine the degree of industrial concentration in Mexico?

We

attempt to answer this question by studying the relationships between
concentration and (1) th~ most efficient firm size needed in a given
industry and (2) the market size of an industry.

We will first discuss the

arguments for (1).

1.

Minimum Optimum Size of Firm

and Concentration

The minimum optimum, or most efficient firm size in an industry is
that size which has the minimum average cost of production (Stigler 1958,
Saving 1961, Weiss 1964, Comanor and Wilson 1967, and Scherer 1973 among
others).

In most of the empirical work on industrial concentration where

the concept of the minimum firm size is used, it is assumed that the long
run average cost of production has an L shape as shown in Figure 3.
size of firm MOS is referred to as the minimum optimum size.

The

TABLE 3
Regressions Between Concentration and/the
Number of Firms in an Industry-~
1970

Independent
Variable

(1)

Intercept

0.49

c2

Number of
Firms

0.26
(0.010)

0.82

(2)

lnc

2

0.40

0.78
(0.043)

0.73

(3)

ln~C

-0.16

0.63
(0.065)

0.33

2

2../ The index of concentration c refers to the number of firms which
2
produce 80% of the industry output.
The rate of change of concentra
tion and of the number of firms is between 1965 and 1970.
Repression (1) is linear and regressions (2) and (3) linear in the
logaritl;lms.
The number of observations (industries) in regressions (1) and (2)
is 123 and in regression (3) 195.
The standard errors are given in parenthesis.
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Figure 3

$

MOS

Output

The size of firm MOS is optimum because it has the lowest average
cost; it is the minimum because firms smaller than MOS have higher average
costs.

This definition of the most efficient size implies that firms larger

than the minimum are also efficient sizes.

To the left of MOS, firms are

subject to diseconomies of scale because of their small size (Stigler 1958,
p. 58) or, seen from another perspective, firms in that segment of the long
run average cost will experience increasing returns to scale if they
increase their size.

If the long run average cost curve slopes upward,

firms in that size range also experience diseconomies of scale (Stigler
1958, p. 61).

The minimum optimum size of firms has been used (Comanor and

Wilson 1967, p. 428) as a proxy variable to estimate economies of scale
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in production.

It should be pointed out that if the economic environment

(access fo capital markets, technological options, etc.) is different for
different sizes of firms, there will be more than a single optimum firm

size.

The optimum firm size may also change through time as factor prices

and technology change.
Optimum firm size may determine concentration, since in some
instances it may not be possible to attain an efficient scale of production
without firms which are so large that concentration is inevitable (Bain 1959).
Moreover, the minimum size may be so large that it becomes an important
barrier to entry of new plants, thus reducing competition and increasing
concentration (Bain 1956, Hall and Weiss 1967, Shepherd 1971).
Further on in this paper we will test the hypothesis that the
larger the minimum optimum firm size in an industry the larger its expected
degree of concentration.

However, in the next section, we discuss the

relation between different measures of market size and concentration.

2.

The Absolute and Relative Extent of the Market and Concentration

It has long been held that an increase in market size reduces concen
tration.

However, despite numberous empirical studies (Nelson 1963,

Evely and Little 1960, and Rosenbluth 1957 among o-thers), the evidence
does not unambiguously support this hypothesis.

The argument that large

~rkets and concentration are inversely related rests on the empirical
observation that (a) large markets have a large number of firms, and
(b) a large number of firms implies a low degree of concentration (see
p. 15 above for empirical evidence on Mexico).
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Altho ugh the abso lute mark et size may be an impo
rtant facto r in
expla ining the degre e of conc entra tion, a more relev
ant notio n of the
market is its relat ive size, that is, the abso lute
size of the mark et
defla ted by a meas ure of the optimum firm size (Pash
igian 1969, Sche rer
1973 ). This relat ive meas ure of mark et size takes
into accou nt the fact
that a given firm size may, or may not, be optimum
depen ding on the size
of the mark ets in which it oper ates. That is, the
effec t of mark et size
on conc entra tion is effec tivel y measu red when the
optimum size of the
firm for that mark et is taken into cons idera tion.
More over, if it is true
that incre ases in the abso lute size of the mark et
decre ases conc entra tion,
and that incre ases in the minimum optimum firm size
incre ases it, then it
follo ws that incre ases in the value of both of these
varia bles could
leave conc entra tion uncha nged. In other word s,
the incre ase in mark et size,
which decre ases conc entra tion, could be offse t by
an incre ase in the optimum
size of the firm which incre ases conc entra tion.
We will empi rical ly meas ure
the effec t that the relat ive mark et size has on the
degre e of conc entra tion.
The steep ness of the slope of the long run avera ge
cost curve for
firms which are smal ler than the minimum optimum
size, may be impo rtant in
expla ining the degre e of conc entra tion of an indus
try (Weis s 1963, Pash igian
1969 ). The argum ent is as follo ws. If the slope
of the long run avera ge
cost curve at subop timal sizes is relat ively horiz
ontal , it is reaso nable
to suppo se it will be relat ively easy for new firms
of less than optimum
size to enter the indu stry, since the diffe rence
in avera ge unit cost betwe en
optimum and less than optimum size is not large .
In other word s, the flatt er
the long run avera ge cost curve for subop timal firm
sizes , the easie r the
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entrance of new firms and, because of the inverse relationship observed
between the number of firms and concentration, the smaller will be the
degree of concentration.

A similar but contrary reasoning can be made if

the slope of the long run average cost curve at suboptimal levels is
fairly steep.
An indirect measure (as opposed to directly estimating a cost

function) of the slope of the average cost curve for firm size less
than the optimum is to calculate the proportion of total output produced
by all the firms of less than the optimum size.

This is the output

produced inefficiently by high cost, less than optimum size firms.

If

the proportion of output produced inefficiently is relatively large, then
the difference in unitary cost between firms of less than optimum size
and those of optimum size is not that large (the slope of the cost curve
to the left of the optimum is not very steep).

Under these circumstances

it is relatively easy for new firms to enter the industry, thus reducing
concentration.

If the proportion of the industry's inefficiently produced

output is small, the converse argument holds:

the difference in average

costs between firms less than optimum and those of optimum size is
probably very large (the slope of the average cost curve in the relevant
segment is very steep).

It is then difficult for firms of less than the

optimum size to enter the industry, thus increasing concentration.

In

other words, the proportion of an industry's total output which is
produced inefficiently (the sum of the output produced by all the firms of
size less than optimum) is a measure of the exten.t to which economies of
scale may be realized if less than optimum size firms increase their size.
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In the following sections we test the hypothesis that the larger the
proportion of the industry output produced inefficiently, the smaller the

degree of concentration and vice versa. Also in the following sections we
test the hypothesis, from (1) above, that the larger the minimum optimum
firm size, the larger its expected degree of concentration.

C. The Model and the Variables
1.

The Model
The least-squares regression specification used in our analysis is

of the multiplicative form!

C

r

•

al

a2

Cr • -~km
AR
I km

£

m

where
A = a constant

C = Index of concentration where r = 1, 2, 3, or 4 refer to different
r
estimates of this index.

Sm= Absolute market size in terms of value of output, value
added, or value of assets.
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~=

Minimum optimum size of firm in terms of value of output,
value added, or value of asse¼ and where k=l, 2, 3, or 4
refer to different estimates of minimum optimum firm size.

Ikm= Proportion of output, or value added produced

inefficiently,

and where k = 1, 2, 3, or 4 refer to the value of this variable
using different estimates of minimum optimum firm size.

s

Relative market size (_1!!_)

~

in terms of value of output,

value added, or value of assets

and according to different

estimates of minimum optimum firm size.

2.

The Variables
In our statistical analysis we used alternative definitions and

measures of the main variables.

The following is a detailed discussion

of their most important properties and how they were calculated.

Indices of Concentration

c1 :

Herfindahal.

l

It is calculated by adding the square of the participation of
each class of firm size in the total output of a given industry.
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where aj is the number of workers, the value of output, the value added
or the value of assets of each class j,

2

and A the total employment or

output or value added or value of assets in a given industry.

In this

index each class is weighted by its relative participatio n in employment,
output, value added or assets of a given industry.

Because of this the

classes of smaller firms have less wei~ht in the measure of concentratio n.
The value of this index fluctuates from 1, when there is only one class
size in the industry to 1/n when there are n number of classes and each has
the same weight.

The value of this index tends toward zero when the

number of classes is very large.

The Herfindahal index has the advan-

tage of showing the degree of inequality of participatio n in employment,
output, value added or assets of different classes of firm size; simul
taneously, it is sensitive to the number of classes in the industry.
It is because of this property that its value decreases when the number
of classes increase.
C2 : The number of firms that together produce 80% of the output of an
industry.

1

Several authors dispute the paternity of this index. According to
Rosenbluth (1957), A. 0. Hirschman first proposed this index in his book
National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (1945).
2when data at the firm level is available, a refers to the number
of workers, value of output, value added, or value jf assets of each firm.
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This index is calculat ed by first adding each class's (going from
largest to smalles t) share of the output until 80% is obtained .
number of firms that produced this output is
this
is

estimate d.

Then the

In some cases

is done directly , in others, some interpol ation within a class
needed.
Notice that there is an inverse relation ship between the value of

this index and the degree of concent ration:

the higher the value of

c2

the lower the degree of concent ration and vice versa.

c3 :

The number of firms that together give employm ent to 80% of the labor
force of an industry .

This index is similar to the precedin g one except that it measures
concent ration accordin g to the degree of employment concent ration.
in the above index, the higher the value of

c3

As

the lower the degree of

concent ration and vice versa.

c4 :

Largest Size Class Particip ation

The proporti on of an industr y's total output which is produced
by the largest size class (in terms of the number of workers ) in that industry .

Minimum Optimum Sizes

.,M

1

: The "survivo r" minimum.
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The estimation of an optimum firm size by determining the size
that survives best in its total economic environment has been suggested
since the time of Mill and Marshall.

This approach has recently

been revived thanks to Stigler (1958) and has been applied in numerous
empirical studies (Savings 1961, Weiss 1964, Sheperd 1967).
Following this approach an optimum firm size is one which has
the minimum average cost of production.

The minimum optimum firm size

must be determined relative to the factors and output market conditions
the firm faces (supply and demand of factors of production, taxes, subsidies,
and prices for its products).

In Stigler's words (1958) an efficient firm

size "is one that meets any and all problems the entrepreneu r actually
faces:

strained labor relations, rapid innovation, government interventio n,

tmstable foreign markets, and what not."

What is that size of firm?

of firm that survives best in the market.

The size

The criteria for evaluating

how well a given firm size has survived is to estimate whether its class's
share of the total output of an industry has increased or decreased.

It

is believed that the firm size with the minimum average cost will be the
size which will best survive in the market.

Accordingly , if there is a

certain firm size whose class is increasing its share in the industry's
output, we can say that the
(see Figure 3).

firm is within the optimum size range

An optimum size that has decreased its share in the

industry's output and "cannot survive rivalry with other sizes is a
contradicti on."

(Stigler 1958, p. 56)
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Since the survivo r techniq ue is nothing but a compar ison of firm
sizes

partici pation rates in two or more periods of time, we compute d

the percent age of industr y value of output, or value added for each class
of every industr y for the Census data of 1965 and 1970,
of growth of partici pation was estimat ed for each class.

First the rate
Then the average

firm size was calcula ted for the class that had the larges t rate of
growth of partici pation .

M : Averag e firm size of the class with the larges t partici pation in
the
2
value of output or the value added of an industr y in a given year.

This minimum optimum size of firm is estimat ed as follows :

p
M

2m

=

m

N

m

where
P

m

= Value of output or value added (when ms 1 or 2 respec tively)

of the class with the greate st share in the total value of
these variab les in a given industr y in a given year.
N = The number of firms in the class with the larges t partici pation
m
in the value of output or value added of an industr y in a
given year.

The unit of measure ment of M is the Mexican
2
moneta ry unit. The estima tes of M are for 1970.
2
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M : Weighted average size of firm.
3
This measure (Pashigia n 1969) is the sum of the average size of
firm in each jth class weighted by that class's participa tion in the
total value of output or value added for each industry.
M3 • nr
m js:1

(p~) x\P{~)
p
1

N

jm

\ m

where
j

•

classes

P
• value of output or value added of the jth class ma 1 or 2,
jm
respectiv ely.
P
m

s:

total value of output or value added in a given industry and
m • 1 or 2 respectiv ely.

N
jm

a

number of firms in the jth class and ms: 1 or 2 as above.

The unit of measurem ent of M is the Mexican monetary tmit; it
3
was calculate d for 1970,

Market Sizes

S : Absolute market size.
m

The absolute market size of an industry in a given year was measured
by the total value of output (m=l)' or the total value added (m=2) of that
industry.
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~ : Relative market size.
This measure:is the absolute market size in an industry divided
by-the relevant minimum optimum size for that industry.

sm
~m

where
S

m

• Absolute market size as defined above.

~m • Minimum optimum firm size, where k • 1, 2, or 3 refer
to the different optimum firm sizes in terms of value of
output (m • 1) or value added (m- 2).
I : Inefficient Production
m

The proportion of the value of output or the value added of all
the firms of less than optimum size and where m = 1 or 2

refers to value

of output or value added respectively.

The data used to estimate our variables and the model was obtained
from the 1965 and 1970 Mexican Industrial Census at the four digit level.

II.

REGRESSION ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS
Tables 4, 5, and 6 summarize the main results of our empirical tests.

Because of the multiplicative form of the regression specification, the
regression coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities between the
concentration variables and (a) absolute and relative market sizes,
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(b) the output or value added produced inefficiently, and (c) the minimum
optimum size of firms.

The data used for all variables is from the 1970

Industrial Census, with the exception of M (minimum optimum size of firm

1

estimated by the survivor technique) which was calculated using data
from the 1965 Industrial Census as well.
The estimated coefficients for all regressions have the expected
sign and their standard errors are sufficiently low to make them statistically significant.

The values of R2 are relatively high with the exception

of the regressions of Table 6.

In Appendix I we include, as an example,

four tables ,which show, for the regressions of Table 5, the average values
and the standard deviations of the variables used in this regression.
The coefficients of the minimum optimum sizes and the absolute market
sizes have the expected signs, and are statistically significant in all
regressions (see Tables 4, 5, and 6).

The signs of M , M , M and M are,
2
1
3
4
as expected, positive for regressions with concentration measured by c
1
and c and negative for regressions with concentration measured by c
4
2
and c since the latter measure the degree of concentration inversely.
3
On the other hand, the coefficients of the different versions of absolute

market sizes have a negative sign in the regressions where concentration
is measured according to
and

c

3

c1

and

c4

and positive for regressions with

c2

, since, as noted above, their values are inversely related to concen

tration.
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TABLE 4
Multiple Regression Equations Explaining Concentration!/

1970
Regressions
Independent Variables
and Other Statistics

c2

c4

M2
(1)
-o. 77
(0.038)

M3
(2)
-1.09
(0.040)

0.06
(0. 018)

0.13
(0.032)

Absolute Market Size (S)

0.80
(0.042)

1.08
(0.044)

--0.12
(0.025)

-0.20
(0.03)

Inefficient Production (I)

0.57
(0.053)

0.14
(0.051)

-0.21
(0.03)

-0.23
(0.034)

R2

0.77

0.86

0.32

0.57

F

203

414

31

77

Number of Industries

179

201

201

180

Relative Market Size (R)

0.73
(0.032)

0.13
(0.051)

-0.062
(O. 018)

-0.10
(0·.027)

Inefficient Production (I)

0.38
(0.055)

1.09
(0.039)

-0.23
(0.039)

-0.22
(0.036)

R2

0.76

0.86

0.28

0.37

F

314

624

38

58

Number of Industries

201

201

201

201

Minimum Optimum Size (M)

a/C

M2

M3

(3)

(4)

is the index of concentration measured as the number of firms that produce
80% of the total output in an industry. c is the index of concentration that
measures the proportion of total output in an 4industry produced by the largest
class of firms in that industry.
2

The definitions of absolute market sizes(~, relative market size (R), inefficient
production (I) and minimum optimum sizes M and M1 are given in the text. All
2
independent variables are measured in terms of the value of industry output.
The statistics in the lower panel refer to the results obtained when the absolute
market size is deflated by the relevant minimum firm size.
The standard
errors are given in parenthesis.
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TABLE 5
Multip le Regres sion Equatio ns Explain ing Concen tration -a/
1970
Regres sions
Indepe ndent Variab les
and other Statis tics

Cl

c3

M2
(1)

M3
(2)

~2
(3)

M3
(4)

0.19
(0.018)

0.12
(0. 033)

-0.76
(0.052)

-1.06
(0.071)

-0.24
(0.021)

-0.21
(0.032)

co. 058)

0.18

1.04
(0.070)

Ineffic ient Produc tion (I) -0.46
(0.026)

-0.34
(0.035)

0.59
(0.068)

0.20
(0.081)

Minimum Optimum Size (M)
Absolu te Market Size (S)

R2

0.73

0.66

0.66

0.76

F

167

113

112

173

Number of Indust ries

185

180

177

169

-0.25
(0.021)

-0.09
(0.034)

0.77
(0.055)

(0. 066)

Ineffic ient Produc tion (I) -0.52
(0.033)

-0.50
(0.054)

0.63
(0.081)

0.25
(0.093)

Relativ e Market Size (R)

1.04

R2

0.69

0.52

0.60

0.75

F

181

100

122

254

Number of Indust ries

167

184

164

177

al

- The index of concen tration C refers to the Herfind ahl index in terms
of
employ ment, and c to the nurn\er of firms that give employment to 80% of
the
3
labor force in the industr y.
The definit ions of absolu te market size (S), relativ e market size (R),
ineffic ient produc tion (I), and minimum optimum sizes M and M are given
in the
2
- text. All indepen dent variabl es are measure d in terms of
3
the value
added in
each indust ry.
The statist ics in the lower panel refer to the results obtaine d when the
absolu te
market size is deflate d by the relevan t minimum firm size.
The standar d
errors are given in parehth esis.
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Multiple Regression Equations Explaining Concentration!_ /

1970
Regression
Independent Variables
and other Stati~ics

c2

C3

Ml
(2)

Ml
(3)

Minimum Optimtl!ll Size (M)

0.059
(O. 037)

-0.28
(0.080)

-0.29
(0.080)

Absolute Market Size (S)

-0.24
(0.059)

0.46
(0.11)

0.53
(0.120)

Inefficient Production (I)

-0.076
(0.040)

0.25
(0.087)

0.36
(0.092)

0~29

0.24

0.30

b/

Number of Industries -

Relative Market Size (R)

6

55
c/

*-

Inefficient Production (I)

Number of Industries

9
91

*
*
*

12
91

0.32
(0.080)

0.34
(0.82)

0.25
(0. 088)

0.35
(0.094)

0.22

0.27

12

16

91

91

a/ The c index refers to concentration measured by the Herfindahl index in terms
1
of'emplo~ent;
c is concentration measured by the number of firms that produce
80% of output in 2an industry; c is concentration measured by the number of firms
that give employment to 80% of 3the labor force in an industry.
The definitions of absolute market size (S), relative market size (R), inefficient
production (I), and minimum optimum size (M), are given in the text. All indepen
dent variables are measured in terms of industry output.
The statistics in the lower panel refer to the results obtained when the absolute
market size is deflated by the relevant minimum optimum size of firm. The
~tandard error of the coefficients are given in parenthesis.
b/ The number of industries for this regression refer to the manufacturing sector alone.
c/ The* indicates that the estimated coefficients were not statisticallv si~nificant.
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Our results, then, add evidence to support the hypothesis (a) that
the larger the minimum optimum size of a firm in an industry the larger the
degree of concentratio n; and (b) that a large absolute market size in an
industry would reduce concentra.ti on.

The converse also holds.

Since

the coefficient s of the M's and the S's measure the elasticitie s of concen
tration with respect to the minimum optimum size and with respect to the
absolute market size, respectivel y, we can say that, for example, an increase
of 10% in the minimum optimum firm size would increase the degree of
concentrati on by 7.7% and that a proportiona l increase of the same mag
nitude in the size of the market would decrease it by 8% (Table 4,
regression 1).

Similar interpretati ons can be made of the regressions in the

other tables.
A proportiona l increase in the minimum optimum size and in the
absolute market size would leave the degree of concentratio n unchanged if
the value of their respective elasticitie s are equal.

This is because of

the contrary effect that an increase in the value of these two variables
would have on concentrati on.

A visual inspection- -as opposed to a

statistical test--of regressions in Tables 4 and 5 shows that the value
of the coefficient s (elasticitie s) of the M's and of the S's do not differ
considerabl y.

The relative stability of the degree of concentratio n in

the industrial sector in Mexico (see Table 2) between 1965 arld 1970 may
have occurred because the effects of market increaseR on concP.ntrati on
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were offset during this period, by the effects of increases in the minimum
optimum sizes.
The coefficient of the variable that measures the proportion of
output or value added produced inefficiently (the I's) has the expected
sign in all regressions.

The sign of this variable is positive in regres

sions where concentration is measured by
tration is measured by
tration inversely.

c1

and

c4 ,

c2

and

c3

and negative when concen

since the latter indices measure concen

Our empirical estimates suggest that the degr~e of

concentration would be small if a large proportion of the total output
of an industry is produced inefficiently and vice versa.

Let us interpret

our results in more detail.
The proportion of output or value added produced inefficiently is
obtained, as explained above, by adding the output, or value added of all
the firms of less than optimum size in an industry.

This variable is

thought of as a proxy variable to measure the steepness of the slope of
the long run average
industry.

cost curve or easiness of entry of new firms into the

If the value of this variable is large it means it is easy for

firms to enter the industry and therefore the degree of concentration would
be reduced.

For example, a decrease of 10% in the value of I (i.e. a

reduction of 10% in the difficulty of entry into the market, e~re~sed
as the unitary cost difference between firms of optimum and less than
optimum size) would reduce concentration by 5.6% according to regression
~l of Table 4 or by 4.6% according to regression 1 of Table 5.
interpretations can be made for other regressions.

Similar

If our analysis is

correct, policies to reduce concentration in Mexico should be seen as
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y by
policie s to reduce the barrier s of entry of new firms into an industr
decrea sing the unitary cost differe nce of firms of differe nt sizes.

The

iently·
magnitu de of the propor tion of output or value added produce d ineffic
can
may be viewed as a measure of the extent to which econom ies of scale
be realize d by increas ing the size of firms which are less than the
I

optimum .

Our empiri cal estima tes, then, lend suppor t to the suppos ition
that there is a signifi cant inverse associa tion between the degree of
concen tration and the steepne ss of the slope of the long run average
cost curve within the range of less than optimum size firms.

Or, in

other words, that the unitary cost differe nces between firms of optimum
and less than optimum size represe nt signifi cant barrier s to entry which
may lead to a decrea se in the number of firms in the industr y and to
an increas e in concen tration .
Finally , the lower panels of Tables 4, 5, and 6 show the coeffic ients
for the regress ions that relate concen tration with the relativ e market
size (absolu te market size divided by the relevan t minimum optimum size.)
In all regress ions the coeffic ients (elasti cities) of this variab le have
the expecte d sign:

positiv e for regress ions where concen tration is

measure d by

c2

and

c3

and negativ e for regress ions where concen tration is

measure d by

c1

and

c4 •

The differe nce in the signs of the coeffic ients

is explain ed as above.

Our results suppor t the notion that the degree

e
of concen tration and the extent of the market measure d as the relativ
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market size are inversely related.

Notice that the depressing effect

of the relative market size on concentration is smaller (the value of
the elasticities are smaller) than the effect of the absolute market
size and that both are statistically significant.

Observe also that

in most regressions the reducing effect of the absolute market size on
cencentration is larger than the opposite effect of the minimum optimum
firm size.

The sign and magnitude of the estimated coefficients for the

regressions with absolute and relative market size underline the impor
tance of Mexico's industrial sector's market expansion as a policy variable
to reduce concentration.
To summarize our results:
1. Our empirical estimates support the view that there is a oositive
relationship between the degree of industrial concentration in Mexico and
the minimum optimum firm size, and a negative relationship between
Mexico's industrial concentration and the absolute size of the industry's
market.
2.

Our results support the hypothesis that there is an inverse

relationship between the degree of concentration and the relative market
size (absolute market size weighed by a minimum optimum firm size) of

each industry.
3. The relative stability of industrial concentration in Mexico
between 1965 and 1970 may be explained by considering that during
~this period the depressing effects of market growth on concentration
were probably offset by the effects of increases in the minimum optimum

firm sizes.
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4.

Our empirical estimates support the argument that there is a

positiverelationship between the degree of concentration and the barriers
to entry as measured by the steepness of the slope of the long-run average
cost curve within the range of less than optimum firm size.

That is, large

unitary cost differences between firms of optimum and less than optimum
size represent significant barriers to entry which may lead to increases
in industrial concentration.
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APPENDIX

Table Al:

Means and Standard Deviation of variables in Regression (1)
of Table 5

Variable

Mean

Standard Deviation

Cl

0.34

0.19

M2

$31,714

41,628

s

$398,746

478,775

I

42%

22

Table A2:

Variable

Mean and Standard Deviation of the variables in
Regression (2) of Table 5

Mean

Standard Deviation

Cl

0.336

M3

$16,503

17,040

s

$352,691

421,784

I

45%

0.19

20
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Table A3:

Varia ble

c3

Mean and Stand ard Devia tion of the varia bles in Regre ssion
(3) of Table 5

Mean
47 firms

Stand ard Devia tion
81

H

$32,34 6

42,24 3

s

$389,3 32

475,8 08

2

I

43%

21
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Table A4:

Variable

c3

Means and Standard Deviation of the variables in
Regression (4) Table 5

Mean
53 firms

Standard Deviation
94

M3

$16,421

16,584

s

$343,170

417,416

I

45%

19
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